by, The Unwanted Publicity Intelligence Guy ( Paul Collin )
LOS ANGELES – December 29, 2014 – For more than a quarter of a century
( 25-years ) United States intelligence cases read like something
straight out of the American motion picture “Mission Impossible” where
only through court cases may Americans ever know or hear much about
such remarkable operations rarely detailed publicly through mainstream
Hero or Devil – Details
Norbert Anthony Schlei ( DOB: 1930 – DOD: 23APR03 – POB: Dayton, Ohio,
USA ), former ( 1962 – 1966 ) U.S. Department Of Justice ( DOJ )
General Counsel who drafted the Civil Rights Act legislation under
U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations
became the U.S. Assistant Attorney General who advised President John
F. Kennedy on the U.S. Navy blockade of Russia military ships
surrounding Cuba amidst the “October Missile Crisis” ‘blocade’ that
nearly started nuclear World War III between Russia and the United
CIA Bond Stings
In the Spring of 1985, Norbert A. Schlei, who later represented Howard
Hughes as a lawyer for HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED ( Los Angeles,
California ) became ‘convinced’ $16,000,000,000 Billion ( face value )
international high-value financial instruments ( i.e. bonds and notes
/ cheques ) represented to him were ‘real’, especially after
consulting with U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ( C.I.A. ) General
Counsel Stanley Sporkin who later told Norbert Schlei the financial
instruments were a “personal matter” the CIA had “no interest” in.
Recycling Counterfeit Bonds
In the Spring of 2009, again Japan “Series 57” certificated bonds
reappeared in Chiasso, Italy at the train border crossing into
Switzerland where an additional $135,000,000,000 Billion ( face value
) in U.S. Federal Reserve Note coupon type bonds were also seized,
that the U.S. Secret Service declared “counterfeit.”
In 1992, Norbert Schlei, assistant chief law enforcement officer of
the United States of America was federally indicted by a U.S. Federal
Grand Jury seated in Tampa, Florida where a True Bill was returned
securing Norbert Schlei; arrested by federal agents. CIA Offer You
With U.S. federal government prosecutors threatening Norbert Schlei
with bringing criminal charges against his own ‘son’, on June 7, 1995
Norbert A. Schlei pled guilty to federal crimes in Florida surrounding
counterfeit high-value international bank financial instruments ( i.e.
Japan Series 57 bonds, etc. ).
On August 4, 1995 Norbert A. Schlei was sentenced by a Tampa, Florida
U.S. District Court federal judge to serve 5-years in federal prison.
Intelligence Fraud Schemes
The following information was extracted from official U.S. federal
court records surrounding certain legacy international bank paper
financial instrument high-value asset certificates, one ( 1 ) or more
of which surrounds what was seized during the middle of 2009 in
Chiasso, Italy at the border of Switzerland, which was only briefly
mentioned by American and foreign mainstream media news broadcasts,
e.g. KYODO, BBC, Bloomberg, REUTER’S News Wire Service, Fox News, NBC,
CNBC, CBS, ABC plus many more.
Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned mainstream media news
outlets bothered to do their research to bring publicly more of the
truth, which is precisely what this particular report reveals and is
designed to warn the public about so fraudulent investments in
‘certain asset instrument securities’ begins to be curtailed.
COURTESY: Kentron Intellect Research ( KentronIntellectResearchVault@Gmail.Com )
SOURCE: Unwanted Publicity Intelligence ( UnwantedPublicity@Gmail.Com )
Billions Of Federal Reserve Note Series 1934 Bonds & Japan Series 57
Bonds Case In U.S. Seizure ( 1985 )
by, Unwanted Publicity Intelligence – Staff Writer
October 18, 2010 08:58:22 Updated ( Original: October 7, 2010 3:22:06 )
WASHINGTON D.C. – October 7, 2010 – A former U.S. federal criminal
case ( immediately below ) is believed to have contained elements
surrounding the July 1, 2009 $135,000,000,000 billion dollar Chiasso,
Italy seizure that also involved, amongst U.S. Federal Reserve Bank
interest bearing coupon bonds, Japan government Series 57 bonds, Japan
Ministry Of Finance, Japan Prime Minister, U.S. brokerage / trading
houses ( in this case, SHEARSON LEHMAN, SMITH BARNEY, E.F. HUTTON ),
the CIA ( in this case the CIA Special Counsel ), Koreans, and what
surrounded ‘secret funds’, i.e. “Marquat Fund” ( also known as )
“M-FUND” versus the Black Dragon Society ( also known as ) White
Dragon Society “Dragon Fund” ), where the the latter Fund may have –
at some point – been confused with the HONGKONG SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION ( HSBC ) “Dragon Fund” investment trading, nevertheless
what was amazing about this early U.S. federal criminal case (
official Apellate case text below ) was, that it involved criminally
prosecuting a former United States Assistant Attorney General (
Norbert A. Schlei ) who got caught-up with the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency ( CIA ), U.S. Central Intelligence Group ( CIG ),
U.S. Office Of Strategic Services ( OSS ), U.S. Secret Service and
more in a case involving international high-value bank paper
[ NOTE: To enlarge image document ( on right side ), begin
“Slideshow,” click here:
The “Background” and “Source Of Instruments” ( below ) from this
particular former case may shock many to see how ‘not just any common
treasure hunter’ became so seriously involved with these high-value
international financial instrument bank paper document ( i.e. bonds,
checks, notes and certificates ) schemes.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO.: 95-3004
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
BARBARA JEAN BRAVENDER AH LOO; and, NORBERT A. SCHLEI,
Defendants – Appellants.
September 18, 1997
Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
( Tampa ) CASE NO.: 92 49 CR T 17C, Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, Judge.
Before: BLACK, Circuit Judge, and FAY and ALARCÓN [ * ], Senior Circuit Judges.
Senior Circuit Judge: ALARCÓN
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( ” Ah Loo ” ) and Norbert A. Schlei
have appealed from the judgments of conviction.
 Schlei also seeks review of the district court’s sentencing
decision. Norbert A. Schlei was convicted of conspiracy and securities
Schlei seeks reversal on numerous grounds, each of which we address below.
We VACATE the order denying Schlei a new trial and an evidentiary
hearing with directions that the District Court make express findings
regarding the alleged ‘witness intimidation’ claim.
We VACATE the judgment of conviction on COUNT 10 because we conclude
that the district court erred in denying Schlei’s Motion To Strike
‘duplicitous allegations’ regarding a ‘separate crime’ in a ‘different
We AFFIRM the District Court Order on the balance of Schlei’s contentions.
The ‘transactions’, that preceded the indictment in this case, ‘are
unusual – if not bizarre’.
Most of the ‘evidence was undisputed’.
The prosecution presented evidence that Norbert A. Schlei and others
attempted to sell certain financial instruments in the United States.
Norbert Schlei, and his sales persons, represented these financial
instruments had been issued by the government of Japan or the DAI-ICHI
KANGYO BANK CO. LTD.
The instruments were labeled “Certificates of Balance of Redemption,
Series 57″ ( the ” Bond Certificates ” ) [ Series 57 Japan government
bond ] with face amounts ranging from 10,000,000,000 Billion yen to
500,000,000,000 Billion yen, and Cashier’s Checks – allegedly issued
by the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK CO. LTD. ( the ” Bank Notes ” ) [ Cashier’s
Cheques / Checks ] – each drawn for 50,000,000,000 billion yen.
The bond certificates [ Series 57 Japan government bond ] were
purportedly issued by the government of Japan in exchange for money or
property received from the bond certificate Holders or payees.
The prosecution ‘theory’ at trial was that Norbert A. Schlei ‘had
actual knowledge’ or ‘deliberately closed his eyes’ to ‘the fact that
these financial instruments were worthless because they were not issued
by the government of Japan or the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK CO. LTD.
Norbert Schlei testified that he ‘believed that the instruments were
valid’ but that ‘corrupt officials of the government of Japan’ had
‘falsely claimed that they were not genuine’.
The ‘Jury was persuaded’ beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the bond
certificates and bank notes were not genuine’ and that ‘Norbert Schlei
had the requisite criminal intent to defraud’ when ‘he represented to
prospective purchasers that these instruments were valid’.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Schlei argues that the judgment must be reversed because the
government failed to present evidence that he intended to defraud
anyone in attempting to sell the bond certificates and the bank notes.
He asserts that the record shows that he informed each prospective
buyer that the government of Japan claimed that these financial
instruments were not valid.
He also maintains that fraud has not been demonstrated because no
reasonable person would have purchased these instruments without
receiving confirmation of their validity from the Japan government, in
view of their extraordinary face value and the disclosures made to
 In addition, Schlei contends that the evidence is also
insufficient to demonstrate that he directly or indirectly
participated in the sale of a bond certificate to undercover officers
in Tampa, Florida.
In discussing whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction against Norbert Schlei, we are required to
review the facts produced at trial by the parties in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518,
523-24 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694
(U.S. Mar. 31, 1997) (No. 96-1557).
In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we “accept[ ] all reasonable
inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor, to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 523. “We
also review de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the convictions.” Id.
1. The Source of the Financial Instruments
In the early part of 1985, Sam M. Han, a Korean – American, met with
C.K. Lee, a fellow Korean – American, and T. Hiraki, a Japan national,
in Los Angeles, California.
Lee and Hiraki told Han that they represented certain persons who
wanted Han’s assistance in getting the government of Japan to
acknowledge the validity of the bond certificates and bank notes.
Han was told by Hiraki and Lee that the government of Japan claimed
that the financial instruments were not genuine and had refused to
honor them. Han urged Lee and Hiraki to seek legal advice.
In March of 1985, Han and C.K. Lee met with Norbert A. Schlei at his
law office in Los Angeles [ California, USA ] to discuss negotiation
of the financial instruments.
Sam M. Han and C.K. Lee informed Norbert Schlei that the ‘government
of Japan would not negotiate with them without pressure from outside
Sometime shortly thereafter, Norbert A. Schlei met with Sam M. Han and
C.K. Lee, as well as a group of Japanese nationals, including Toshio
Norbert Schlei, Sam M. Han, and Takahashi later traveled to Japan and
‘interviewed persons’ who ‘possessed some of the bond certificates and
The ‘Holders of these instruments’ informed Norbert Schlei and Sam M.
Han that ‘they received them from a woman’ named ” Hatsu Aoyagi “.
On April 8, 1985 Norbert A. Schlei and Sam M. Han met with Stanley
Sporkin, the General Counsel for the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ( “
CIA ” ).
At this meeting, Norbert Schlei told CIA General Counsel Stanley
Sporkin that he had been informed by a group of Japanese citizens that
a secret $2,000,000,000 billion dollar Fund [ ” Marquat Fund ” ( also
known as ) ” M-FUND ” ] had been accumulated by General Douglas
MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan.
Norbert A. Schlei stated the secret Fund [ ” Marquat Fund ” ( also
known as ) ” M-FUND ” ] came from ‘money confiscated from foreigners’,
‘the Imperial Family’, and ‘property seized’ during the ‘Japan
occupation of Korea’.
Norbert Schlei’s alleged ‘informants’ referred to it as the ” Marquat
Fund ” ( the, ” M FUND ” ).
Norbert Schlei told CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin that the Fund
[ ” Marquat Fund ” ( also known as ) ” M-FUND ” ] was ‘Administered by
the United States’ and the ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ in Japan.
Norbert Schlei related he was informed that in 1958, Vice-President
Nixon promised to give Okinawa to Japan and turn control of the [ “
Marquat Fund ” ( also known as ) ” M-FUND ” ] over to Japan in
exchange for Japan’s support in electing him President of the United
Norbert Schlei told CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin that ‘a woman
who had been indicted’ for the ‘forgery of these financial
instruments’ had been ‘acquitted of that charge’.
CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin testified that Norbert A. Schlei
declared that he ‘wanted the CIA to know he was going to try to
present these instruments for payment’ and “wanted to give [ Sporkin ]
a heads up to a possible political problem.”
CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin informed Norbert Schlei that he
knew nothing about the financial instruments [ ” Marquat Fund ” ( also
known as ) ” M-FUND ” ] and that the story Norbert Schlei had related,
Sporkin also testified that he thought, “it was a crazy idea, preposterous.”
CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin promised Norbert Schlei that he
would call him to indicate whether the CIA had any interest in
Schlei’s ‘plan to attempt to sell the bond certificates and the bank
In a subsequent telephone call, CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin
told Nortbert Schlei that the ‘CIA had no interest in the proposed
sale of the financial instruments’ because “[i]t was a private
After returning to Los Angeles [ California ], Norbert Schlei ‘agreed
to provide legal representation’ to T. Hiraki, Toshio Takahashi, C.K.
Lee, and Sam M. Han “in relation to the negotiation and cashing of
certain checks and other instruments.”
The undersigned parties agree as follows:
Norbert A. Schlei agrees to provide such legal services as may be
required in relation to the negotiation and cashing of certain checks
and other instruments with respect to which his assistance is sought,
including but not limited to cheques numbered A35261, A35262, A35263,
A35264, A35265 and A35266 drawn on the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK CO. LTD.
T. Hiraki and Toshio Takahashi, acting on their own behalf and on
behalf of ” Sadao Niwa ‘ and ‘other owners of the documents’ to which
this Agreement relates, and C.K. Lee and Sam M. Han, acting on their
own behalf, agree that the fee to be paid for such legal services
shall be a ‘contingent fee of 5% of the amount recovered on such
checks or other instruments’; provided, however, that T. Hiraki and T.
Takahashi shall have the option, for thirty ( 30 ) days after the date
hereof, to reduce the contingent fee (a) by 1% ( to 4% ) by paying a
retainer fee of $50,000 in cash, or (b) by 2% ( to 3% ) by paying a
retainer fee of $100,000 in cash.
Wherefore the undersigned have duly executed this agreement.
Norbert A. Schlei
C. K. Lee
Sam M. Han
In May of 1985, Schlei and Lee tried to negotiate one [ 1 ] of the
bank notes at the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK in Japan. The bank notified
Schlei that it would not honor the bank note because it was a forgery.
In furtherance of the plan to sell the bond certificates and bank
notes, Schlei filed the Articles Of Incorporation of the JAPAN-AMERICA
FOUNDATION INC. ( ” Foundation ” ) in Panama on January 6, 1986.
Norbert A. Schlei was a designated board member – Secretary and
Treasurer – of the Foundation [ JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC. ].
Takahashi was named as the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer [ of JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC. ].
Han was designated as the president of the Foundation [ JAPAN-AMERICA
FOUNDATION INC. ].
Pursuant to the articles of incorporation, the Foundation [
JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC. ] was formed to ‘arrange the assignment
of the bond certificates and bank notes’ from the ‘nominees’ or
‘payees’, and ‘to invest the proceeds of any sale’ “to benefit the
peoples of Japan and the United States or secondarily the ‘peoples of
the nations of the Pacific Basin and the world’.”
C.K. Lee, Michael Dow, and Jesse Levine were indicted on January 31,
1986 in the U.S. District of Nevada for attempting to sell some of the
Upon being informed of the arrest of Lee, Dow, and Levine, Norbert A.
Schlei went to Nevada to help them.
Norbert A. Schlei also wrote a letter, to the U.S. Attorney for the
U.S. District of Nevada, demanding the return of the bond certificates
and bank notes to the Foundation [ JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC. ] as
the owner of the instruments.
On February 17, 1986 – approximately 3-weeks after C.K. Lee was
indicted for attempting to sell forged bond certificates – Norbert A.
Schlei met with U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield at the U.S. Embassy in
Also present were Daniel Russel, the U.S. Ambassador’s executive
assistant, and John Weeks, the Embassy’s assistant Financial Attaché.
At this meeting, Norbert Schlei related the alleged ‘genesis’ of the
‘bond certificates’ and the ‘bank notes’, as related to him by his
Russel testified at trial.
He summarized Schlei’s narration as follows:
“Well, he recounted a very elaborate tale of conspiracy involving some
hidden Japan war treasures that includes the systematic connivance of
such figures as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur and the first
Prime Minister of Japan as well as the complete pantheon of senior
Japan officials then in the Government, as I recall including – up to
and including – the Prime Minister of Japan in some elaborate cover-up
At his meeting with U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield, Norbert Schlei
‘did not present any documents or other evidence to corroborate’ his
account of ‘the source’ of the financial instruments.
Schlei also failed to advise U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield that C.K.
Lee had been ‘recently indicted’ for ‘attempting to sell forged bond
Russel testified, that his position as executive assistant to the U.S.
Ambassador required him to be informed regarding Japan politics.
Russel testified, that he found “it totally unbelievable that such a
conspiracy could have been in progress for ‘decades without becoming
widely known’,” because “it involved such a massive conspiracy that
would have entailed the connivance of virtually every senior
politician in Japan.”
The day following his meeting, in the U.S. Embassy, Norbert Schlei
drafted a letter to U.S. Ambassador Mansfield in which Schlei related
– in greater detail – his clients’ representations regarding the
‘source’ of the bond certificates and bank notes.
Schlei’s message was typed on the letterhead of the U.S. Embassy in
Japan in two (2) separate formats.
One [ 1st ] statement, received as Exhibit 17 at trial, contained the
following words in the first [ 1st ] paragraph.
The following, is the ‘re-typed text of a letter’ received from
Norbert Schlei summarizing the information provided by him at the
meeting ( referred to above ):
[ Exhibit 17 ]
“Dear Ambassador Mansfield,”
[ … EDITED-OUT FOR BREVITY … ] ended with the words,
“Sincerely, Norbert A. Schlei.”
The other [ 2nd ] statement, received into evidence as Exhibit 21, did
not contain the above-quoted language:
[ Exhibit 21 ]
[ … EDITED-OUT FOR BREVITY … ]
“Different policy was adopted, and a large number of holders were
utilized. At the present time about eighty ( 80 ) individuals hold
documents representing a ‘portion’ of the Fund.
When the individuals, holding the documents, representing the Fund
began to demand a voice in administering the Fund, the government
At various times it forcefully demanded return of the documents, but
very few Holders responded.
In order to prevent these documents from being negotiated, the
government has at times advised persons making inquiry about these
documents that they are ‘forged’.
However, my clients assert that most of the documents presently
outstanding can be shown to have been printed at a factory of the
Finance Ministry in ‘1981’ by Order of Finance Minister Michio
Watanabe, now Minister of International Trade and Industry.
The ink used for the printing, they assert, is the ink used for
printing the old paper money, now no longer circulating, and is
totally unavailable except to the Ministry of Finance.
The face value of instruments, now outstanding, probably exceeds – by
a considerable margin – the amount of money actually in the Fund.
This results partly from the activities of a woman named Hatsu Aoyagi
who worked closely with Tanaka and had a role in selecting the Holders
of the securities representing the Fund.
Ms. Aoyagi was convicted of fraud and misappropriation of funds within
the past year in a Tokyo court.
One thing she apparently did was to charge people large sums to become
Holders of the Fund’s securities. She represented that the fees
charged would go to the Party, but in fact she pocketed most of them.
Also, although – in some instances – she was supposed to exchange one
[ 1 ] ‘set’ of securities for ‘another’, in some instances she simply
‘distributed the new ones without collecting the old’.
Because of this practice, and perhaps other irregularities, the ‘face
value’ of the instruments outstanding is approximately Yen
130,000,000,000,000 Trillion – whereas the actual amount of the Fund
is believed to be a maximum of approximately Yen 50,000,000,000,000
My clients assert that one of the reasons for their determination to
bring this matter to a head is that the ‘Fund has been productive of
impropriety and corruption’.
In addition to Mr. Kishi, they say that Mr. Tanaka misappropriated a
large fortune of 10,000,000,000,000 Trillion yen, which is invested
through the ‘UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND’.
They state that Mrs. Hiroko Sato, widow of Premier Eisaku Sato,
‘cashed documents’ amounting to ‘300,000,000,000 Billion yen’ through
the ‘CHASE BANK’.
According to my clients, Secretary of the Cabinet Mr. Masaharu Gotoda,
who has somewhat impeded their settlement, has personally cashed three
[ 3 ] checques through the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK for a total sum of
60,000,000,000 Billion yen.
It is, of course, possible that some of these sums were further
transferred and applied to proper purposes.
With a view to testing the reliability of some of the assertions made
by my clients I asked how it was known that Mr. Gotoda had obtained
60,000,000,000 Billion yen from the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK.
The reply was, that a ‘member of our group’ is an ‘official of a
government agency’, which was engaged at the time in a ‘special
investigation’; that when Mr. Gotoda conducted his final negotiation
with a high official of the Bank [ DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK ], he did so
on a ‘telephone line that happened to be tapped’; that the Bank [
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK ] asked Mr. Gotoda to accept 50,000,000,000
Billion yen but he adamantly refused, after which arrangements were
made on the telephone to pay him the full amount demanded.
I believe that the negotiations relating to this matter will be
concluded in any and all events by the end of the Japan government
fiscal year on March 31.
If the non-profit Foundation we have formed is indeed founded, it will
have an enormous potential for good.
Two [ 2 ] people, U.S. Senator Alan Cranston and Jack Anderson, the
syndicated columnist, have been asked by people in our group to serve
as Trustees and have agreed to do so.
I plan to ask [ U.S. Senator ] Ted Kennedy to join us.
You would be an ideal Trustee if your post [ Assistant U.S. Attorney
General ] would permit such service.
As you know, I am providing this information on the understanding that
it will be ‘kept confidential in the sense of not being disclosed to
the public’, and will ‘not be attributed to me’.
Any use of this information you may feel is in the interests of the
United States, in terms of ‘disclosure within the government’, is not
objectionable to me or my clients.
I will keep you informed.
Again thanks, and kindest personal regards.
Desaix Anderson, DCM
Bill Breer, POL”
Agreements for the sale or lease of the bond certificates and
bank notes between the Foundation [ JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC. ]
and HILL & ASSOCIATES for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 [
4-years ] were introduced into evidence at trial.
Han or Schlei signed these agreements on behalf of the Foundation.
Hill [ HILL & ASSOCIATES INC. ] promised to advise any potential buyer
that the Japan government disputed the authenticity of the bonds.
Hill [ HILL & ASSOCIATES INC. ] was also furnished a written
disclosure form for distribution to potential customers.
September ___, 1988
As you know we have discussed several times various Japan
‘Certificates of Redemption’ and ‘Cashiers Cheques’ denominated [ sic
] in Japanese Yen, that purport to be issued by, the:
BANK OF JAPAN;
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK; and,
Other leading Japan financial institutions.
It is the purpose of this letter to establish that HILL & ASSOCIATES
INC. has made ‘full disclosure of the problems that exist with respect
to these instruments’, and that ‘none of our discussions have been
based on any material misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material
The Payees of the instruments, here involved, have stated that they
believe the instruments were in fact issued by the institutions by
whom they purport to have been issued, and that the instruments
represent a Confidential Fund of money ( the so-called ” M-FUND ” )
which has been administered by the Liberal Democratic Party for some
three ( 3 ) decades [ 30-years ].
The Fund is believed to have been established during the U.S.
occupation, with the approval of [ U.S. Army ] General MacArthur, and
to have been the subject of several ‘secret agreements’ between the
U.S. and Japan or the Liberal Democratic Party culminating in the
giving up – by the U.S. in the late 1950’s – of any right to
participate in administration of the fund.
Although I have informed you of these matters and other details, I
wish to make it clear that this information is entirely hearsay [ sic
] so far as I am concerned and ‘I cannot and do not warrant the
correctness or completeness of this information’.
The Payees of the instruments have also stated that in their view
there is no legal obstacle to negotiation of the instruments by them;
that opposition by the Government of Japan or the Liberal Democratic
Party is merely political and not legally sustainable. However, it
certainly is clear that ‘the Government of Japan and those of the
institutions do challenge the genuineness and the enforceability of
In the only case in which any of these instruments was formally
presented for payment, a cashier’s checque purportedly issued by the
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK was ‘rejected as not genuine after being held by
the Bank for 35-days after presentation’.
HILL & ASSOCIATES INC. is, accordingly, ‘unable to warrant and does
not warrant the genuineness or enforceability of the instruments’.
Essentially, HILL & ASSOCIATES INC., is stating to you that ‘these
instruments are without warranty other than a warranty that it has
duly acquired the proper Power Of Attorney in and to these
By your signature below, you acknowledge receipt of the information
set forth above and your understanding of the ‘severe limitations on
the warranty’ in ‘relation to any proposed transactions’ between
__________________ and HILL & ASSOCIATES INC.
Roger A. Hill, President
HILL & ASSOCIATES INC.
Acknowledged: September ____, 1988″
The language contained in the ‘disclosure form’ was virtually
identical to that contained in the April 24, 1986 letter to Hill,
quoted above, making no reference to Lee’s ‘earlier arrest’ for
‘attempting to sell forged bond certificates’.
On July 2, 1991 Hill called FBI Agent Phil Rence at the request of a
law firm he had contacted regarding an attempted sale of the bond
certificates. Hill informed Agent Rence that he had been involved in
the sale of these instruments for approximately 6-years.
Hill stated he previously had offered Japan bond certificate number
1261 for sale.
FBI Agent Rence notified Hill he had taken a copy of Japan bond
certificate 1261 to the Japan consulate in San Francisco where a
Ministry of Finance representative provided the FBI with a letter
stating the certificate was ‘not genuine’.
Approximately 1-week after his conversation with FBI Agent Rence,
Hill received Japan bond certificate 1261 from Bobby Chamberlain,
the accountant of Takahashi.
In November 1991, Hill asked FBI Agent Rence whether he was doing
anything wrong in continuing to try and sell the bond certificates
in view of the fact he intended to have any prospective buyer sign an
agreement in which the purchaser acknowledged that he or she had been
informed that the genuineness of the bond certificate was ‘in dispute’.
FBI Agent Rence told Hill the bond certificates were “bogus” and no
“buyer beware clause” would help him if he continued to try to sell
the bond certificates.
During Hill’s negotiations with the Foundation [ JAPAN-AMERICA
FOUNDATION INC. ], he met with Han and Takahashi in the office of
Norbert Schlei where Hill saw at least fifty ( 50 ) of the bond
certificates on Schlei’s coffee table.
Hill made several attempts to sell the bond certificates and the bank
notes prior to January 18, 1992. None was successful.
b. The Role of Ah Loo and Howard Olson in Attempting to Negotiate the
Beginning in December 1986, Ah Loo conducted business in Hong Kong as
TRANSFIELD INVESTMENTS LIMITED ( ” TRANSFIELD ” ).
In September 1987, Ah Loo negotiated with John Blomfield of MERRILL
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER and SMITH regarding sale of “Japan debentures.”
During the course of their correspondence, Blomfield sent Ah Loo a
copy of an unsigned letter he had received dated February 28, 1987
from Minoru Yoneda, an associate advisor in the Tokyo BANK OF JAPAN
Government Bond Department.
This letter provided in pertinent part, that:
“in Japan, the Government do [ sic ] not issue the ‘Certificate of
Redemption Balance’ that you sent us in copy-form. Such Certificate is
not a true bond, but a fictitious one, and we regret to inform you that
the Certificate is often used in fraudulent practices.”
On October 1, 1987 Takahashi granted Kelly Chang and Lau Jim Koon his
Power Of Attorney [ POA ] to “negotiate on [ his ] behalf with
investment consultant firms, financial consortium, banks and trust
body [ sic ] as may be deemed qualified and necessary for the investment
of these Debentures.”
On October 15, 1987, Koon and Chang ‘assigned’ bond certificates to
TRANSFIELD to assist “in the disposition of said Bonds.”
On October 28, 1987 Schlei wrote to Ah Loo’s bank in Hong Kong, “at
the request of [ his – Schlei’s ] client, Mr. Toshio Takahashi,” to
verify funds were available to pay for the ‘assignment of the bond
certificate’ to TRANSFIELD.
Schlei also attached an Affidavit, in which he alleged possessing bond
certificates 1276, 1280, 1354 and 1664, plus advised that pursuant to
instructions from his client, he was prepared to deliver the bond
certificates to a Buyer.
Over the ensuing months, Ah Loo and her attorney Alistair Robertson
communicated with Takahashi and Schlei regarding her efforts to sell
the bond certificates.
In January 1988, Ah Loo contacted Howard Olson, a resident of Minot,
North Dakota, to discuss his interest in obtaining financing for a
proposed real estate development.
Ah Loo had met Olson when she resided in Nevada in 1985.
In 1985, Olson and Ah Loo had discussed Olson’s plans for a
condominium project in North Dakota, and his need for $2,000,000 to
$3,000,000 million dollars in financing.
When Ah Loo moved – in December 1986 – to Hong Kong, she continued to
assist Olson in attempting to obtain financing for Olson’s real estate
Ah Loo also authorized Olson to serve as a special representative of
TRANSFIELD. She gave him a Power Of Attorney [ POA ] with respect to a
bank account in the name of TRANSFIELD at FIRST AMERICAN BANK & TRUST
( ” First American ” ) of Minot [ North Dakota, USA ].
Ah Loo first mentioned the bond certificates to Olson in January 1988.
Olson told Ah Loo that he thought he could use one of the bond
certificates as collateral for a loan on his development project.
In February 1988, Ah Loo sent Japan bond certificate number 1395 to
FIRST AMERICAN BANK & TRUST [ Minot, North Dakota, USA ].
Olson then transferred Japan bond certificate 1395 to E.F. HUTTON
SECURITIES ( “E.F. Hutton” ).
E.F. HUTTON served as his broker in negotiations concerning the instrument.
E.F. HUTTON requested SHEARSON LEHMAN determine whether the instrument
After making an inquiry through its Tokyo [ Japan ] office SHEARSON
LEHMAN informed E.F. HUTTON the bond certificate was forged.
E.F. HUTTON immediately advised, Olson, they would not accept the bond
certificate because it was “no good.”
Shortly thereafter, the FBI ordered Olson to cease and desist his
attempts to negotiate the bond certificate.
Olson informed Ah Loo of the FBI warning, as well as the E.F. HUTTON
refusal to deal with the bond certificate.
Once the Olson plan to use the bond certificate as collateral for a
bank loan failed, Olson began negotiating with Paul Bennett, who
indicated that a pension fund he represented was interested in
purchasing the bond certificate.
In the first half of March 1988, Olson and Schlei had several
telephone conversations regarding the potential sale of the bond
certificate to the pension fund.
Olson testified that he informed Schlei that E.F. HUTTON “didn’t want
to deal with [ the bond certificate ].”
In addition, Olson advised Schlei of the FBI warning.
Nevertheless, Schlei told him to continue his efforts to sell the bond
On March 9, 1988 Takahashi sent a letter to Olson demanding either
$2,362,205 in payment for bond certificate 1395 or immediate return
of the instrument to Schlei as Takahashi’s representative.
On March 11, 1988 Schlei sent a letter to Ah Loo, which included the
“Mr. Takahashi has asked me to advise you that, because of repeated
failures by you and your representatives to carry out the terms of
your agreement for the purchase of the [ bond certificate No. 1395 ],
he has terminated the agreement and hereby makes demand on you to
return the Certificate or cause it to be returned forthwith.
Since the certificate is now in the United States in the possession of
Howard Olson, Mr. Takahashi asks that the certificate be delivered to
me as his representative.”
On March 18, 1988, Olson informed Schlei that Olson would be dealing
directly with Schlei regarding bond certificate 1395, and that Ah Loo
would no longer participate in the pending negotiations with the
That same day, Schlei sent a letter to Takahashi concerning Olson’s
efforts to sell the bond certificate. It reads in pertinent part as
“I have your FAX of today and understand fully your concerns. I will
cancel the transaction with Olson if you feel we must do so. However,
before canceling as you have requested I would like to report my
latest communications with Olson.
Mr. Olson states that he knows almost nothing about the history of
this matter in Hong Kong.
I have told him some of the bad things done by Ah Loo and Taguchi and
he says he cannot blame you for being angry. However, he adds, he did
not participate in those things and feels he has been completely fair
and honest with us.
Olson readily admits that the form of this transaction has changed
since he first became involved. Originally, he says, he had arranged
to do a transaction involving the SHEARSON LEHMANN [ sic ] firm. This
transaction also involved Mr. Searcy’s bank and was at one time ready
to close. However, SHEARSON withdrew as a result of its contacts with
the BANK OF JAPAN.
Therefore, Olson had to make different arrangements.
Olson says the transaction he has arranged is the same one he
described to me when I first called him, namely, a transaction
involving a pension fund. Olson’s company would be buying our
certificate and using it ( and certain mining properties being pledged
by Olson ) to borrow money from a pension fund headquartered in
The money being lent by the pension fund would be used to pay the
purchase price to us.
. . . [ EDITED-OUT ] . . .
For all of the above reasons, I recommend that you ‘hold off
canceling’ Olson’s transaction. ( emphasis added ).”
Olson’s proposed sale of Japan bond certificate 1395 to the pension
fund fell through in April 1988. At that time, bond certificate 1395
was in Bennett’s possession.
Olson instructed Bennett to mail the instrument to Schlei who also
directed Bennett to return the bond.
Bond certificate 1395 was never returned to Schlei.
Olson had no further direct contact with Schlei after April 1988.
On April 22, 1988 Olson wrote the following letter to Dr. Carmelo
Profilo and Chang, Ah Loo’s business associates:
“Once again I have experienced a rejection of a proposed sale of one
of the Certificates of Redemption due to influence created by the
The Certificate had been sold and an escrow opened subject to the
Buyer checking with the government of the Issuing Country.
The reason for checking was that this Buyer ( a Prince ) is involved
on another deal with them of several billion dollars on a different
Project, and he needed to know that this purchase would not change
their relationship or nullify any of their plans.
The response was very negative, and the Buyer was forced to drop this
purchase immediately and stay clear of those Certificates.
The Buyer was also partners with several Senators in the deal and gave
strong repercussions back to me, and I was again notified by the
Federal authorities to cease [ sic ] and desist all operations
concerning these Certificates.
I have begun [ sic ] the process of returning the Certificate and all
the Supporting Documents to Transfield immediately.
On October 7, 1988 Ah Loo was informed by an attorney, whom she had
been dealing with respect to the sale of the bond certificates, that
officials at the BANK OF JAPAN determined they were forgeries, and
“exactly the same copies used in a previous case of fraud in Hong
c. The Attempted Sale of Bond Certificates to Kazimir Golac by Schlei
The record shows that, late in 1988, Schlei and Takahashi attempted to
sell several bond certificates to Kazimir Golac.
In a letter to Schlei, dated October 14, 1988 Takahashi set forth a
proposed distribution of the proceeds from the anticipated Golac sale.
The letter provided that half of the income should go to the
Foundation from the sale of “your and my shares” of the 10,000,000,000
billion yen bond certificates.
Takahashi also suggested that the Foundation should get 15,000,000,000
billion yen “from our share of the sale of the 300,000,000,000 billion
yen bond certificates.”
Takahashi explained that “personally and privately your income will be
1.8bs + 3.0bs = 4.8 billion Japanese yens. Mine is the same.”
Takahashi also recommended that the proceeds of the sale, excluding
those designated for the Foundation, should be divided equally among
Han, Schlei, and Takahashi.
The Golac transaction was never consummated.
d. Craig Ivester Role in Attempting to Negotiate the Financial Instruments
Sometime during 1987 or 1988, Ah Loo was introduced to Craig Ivester,
a locator of commodity transactions, employed by BANCORP INTERNATIONAL.
Ivester informed, Ah Loo, he had prospective buyers for the bond certificates.
Ah Loo furnished Ivester with a copy of a bond certificate.
Ivester sent the copy of the bond certificate to BANCORP INTERNATIONAL.
BANCORP INTERNATIONAL presented the copy of the bond certificate to
UBS [ UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND ] Switzerland. UBS Switzerland later
reported to BANCORP INTERNATIONAL that the bond certificate was
fraudulent. Ivester relayed this information to Ah Loo.
3. The Sting Operation
In August 1991, Ah Loo was reintroduced to Ivester by Dallas Thompkins.
Ivester was assisting Thompkins in attempting to obtain financing for
Thompkins’ company, MID-WAY CAPITAL.
Ivester and Ah Loo discussed the bond certificates.
Thereafter, Craig Ivester contacted Special Agent Noonan of the United
States Customs Service [ now, U.S. Department of Homeland security (
DHS ), to determine whether he was interested in investigating Ah
Loo’s involvement with the bond certificates. Ivester had previously
worked with Agent Noonan as a confidential informant.
After Agent Noonan expressed interest in pursuing the investigation,
Ivester arranged to meet Ah Loo on September 11, 1991. At this
meeting, Ivester told Ah Loo that he represented a group interested in
purchasing bond certificates.
On September 12, 1991, Ah Loo sent Ivester a copy of a document
entitled “Private Placement Procedures,” and copies of two ( 2 ) bond
certificates. Ivester forwarded these documents to Agent Noonan. Agent
Noonan shared the information he had received from Ivester with Secret
Service Agent Jack Fox.
Ivester arranged the initial meeting between Ah Loo and his alleged
prospective buyers. This meeting occurred in Reno, Nevada in October
1991. In attendance were Ivester, Ah Loo, Agent Fox, and Customs
Service Special Agent Michael Sankey.
Agent Fox introduced himself as an officer of FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO.
Agent Sankey identified himself as Michael Montclair, the President of
a large international investment company.
The conversation was surreptitiously recorded by the agents.
During the Reno [ Nevada ] meeting, Ah Loo explained to Agent Fox and
Agent Sankey that General MacArthur – in an attempt to shorten the
supply lines for the Korea War – created a fund to permit Japan, which
at the time was prohibited from developing its military, to
manufacture munitions for use in the Korean War. She stated that the
proceeds for the fund were obtained from the money and property of
certain persons who had been loyal followers of the Emperor of Japan.
In exchange, these investors received bond certificates.
Ah Loo also informed Agent Fox and Agent Sankey that the bank notes
had been issued as payment for redemption of the bond certificates,
but that someone had printed an overrun of these bank notes. She told
the agents that the ‘excess bank notes were fraudulent’.
Ah Loo warned Agent Fox and Agent Sankey that they might not want to
purchase the bond certificates because, some persons had been
‘arrested’ and others ‘killed for dealing in these financial
She also represented that the bond certificates would not be redeemed
at maturity, but would be rolled over.
Agent Fox and Agent Sankey expressed interest in purchasing one bond
certificate, but no agreement was reached during the Reno [ Nevada ]
In early September 1991, Hill was introduced to Ah Loo by J. Maillian
who informed – Ah Loo – that he was representing Hill in his efforts
to sell bond certificates. At this time Ah Loo did not have any of the
bond certificates in her possession. Hill agreed to make a bond
certificate available to Ah Loo for sale to Agent Fox and Agent
On September 20, 1991 Hill signed a handwritten agreement drafted by
Takahashi in which Hill agreed to sell three [ 3 ] bond certificates
and one [ 1 ] bank note.
This agreement provides that Hill and Takahashi “should keep strict
secrecy from anyone regarding this agreement and should not disclose
to any one [sic] else for ever [sic] without written agreement by
Both.” The agreement is signed by Hill as “Party A,” and Takahashi as
Takahashi provided Hill with three [ 3 ] bond certificates, including
number 1261, and bank note 59155.
On September 20, 1991 Takahashi placed nine (9) calls, to Schlei, from
his hotel room at the Sheraton Grande in Los Angeles. The record also
shows that Schlei paid Takahashi’s hotel bill.
Hill testified that he did not inform Takahashi that Ah Loo was
involved in the transaction.
Hill also testified that Takahashi had informed him that Schlei did
not want Takahashi to deal with Hill.
Ah Loo met again with Agent Fox and Agent Sankey in early December 1991.
Ah Loo represented to the agents that the bond certificates could be
redeemed, but not everyone could redeem them.
She told the agents that the bonds had already been certified as valid
in the Japan courts and that “she had originally obtained one [ 1 ] of
these instruments in Hong Kong from Schlei, a former Assistant United
States Attorney General.”
During this meeting, they did not reach an agreement on the terms of
the sale of the bond certificate.
In late December 1991, Agent Fox informed Ah Loo that he preferred to
use the SMITH BARNEY office in Tampa [ Florida ] as the escrow agent.
Throughout the early part of January 1992, Agent Fox and Ah Loo
communicated by telephone to discuss final arrangements for the sale
of the bond certificate.
On January 7, 1992 Ah Loo, Ah Loo’s son Bruce Hansberry, and Lee met
at Ah Loo’s residence in Los Angeles to discuss the acquisition of
additional bond certificates by Lee.
Hansberry testified that during this meeting “the validity or
authenticity of these bonds were [sic] brought into question regarding
[ Lee’s ] involvement in an effort by the FBI to confiscate the bonds
from [ Lee ].”
Although this meeting was unrelated to the sale of the bond
certificate to Agent Fox and Agent Sankey, Hansberry testified that
“[t]he [ bond certificate ] series was the same. The question was
implanted, there were doubts.”
On January 9, 1992 A. George Saks, executive vice president and
general counsel of SMITH BARNEY, signed a proposal letter at Agent
Fox’s request that set forth the SMITH BARNEY purported willingness to
purchase three ( 3 ) “Series 57 Certificates of Balance of Redemption
Japanese National Bonds” from Ah Loo for $140,000,000 million.
In return, the SMITH BARNEY fee for its services – as escrow agent –
was set forth as $1,400,000 million.
Ah Loo assured Agent Fox that at the closing someone would explain to
him how to certify the bond certificate’s authenticity.
Hansberry told Agent Fox that he had already sold three [ 3 ] of the
bond certificates. Hansberry admitted after his arrest that this
representation was false.
The parties agreed that the purchase price for one [ 1 ] bond
certificate would be $100,000,000 million dollars. Of that amount, Ah
Loo was to receive $19,000,000 million dollars, SMITH BARNEY would be
paid $1,000,000 million dollars for its services, and Hill was to
receive $80,000,000 million dollars. Hill agreed to pay Takahashi
$20,000,000 million dollars.
On January 16, 1992 Hill and Takahashi met in Takahashi’s hotel room
at the Sheraton Grande in Los Angeles. Takahashi told Hill that his
$20,000,000 million dollar share of the proceeds from the sale to
Agent Fox and Agent Sankey would be divided between Han, Schlei,
Sakai, Horiguchi, and himself. Takahashi notes reflecting this
division of the proceeds were described at trial as the “payout
sheet.” Takahashi told Hill at the January 16, 1992 meeting that
Schlei knew that a bond certificate transaction was closing.
On January 17, 1992 Hill and Hansberry traveled to Tampa [ Florida ]
to deliver the bond certificate to Agent Fox and Agent Sankey. Because
of medical problems, Ah Loo did not attend the meeting, but
participated by telephone.
On January 18, 1992 Hill handed bond certificate 1291 to Agent Fox.
Immediately thereafter, Hill and Hansberry were arrested.
At the time of their arrest, Hill and Hansberry admitted that they
knew that bond certificate 1291 was fraudulent. Hill consented to a
search of the safety deposit box assigned to him at the Embassy Suites
Hotel in Tampa [ Florida ].
The search disclosed additional bond certificates, ‘bank note 59155’,
the ‘disclosure form’, a copy of the ‘United States Embassy letter’
identified at trial as Exhibit 21, and Takahashi’s “payout sheet” for
the Tampa transaction.
Hill placed a telephone call to Takahashi following his arrest. On the
same date, Takahashi made eleven ( 11 ) phone calls to Schlei, including
two (2) that were placed immediately after he spoke with Hill over the
On January 19, 1992 agents searched Takahashi’s Los Angeles hotel
room. The room was registered to Osamu Sakai. It was vacant, although
food, clothes, and documents were scattered throughout. Takahashi made
4 phone calls to Schlei on January 19, 1992; 21 on January 20, 1992;
and 20 on January 21, 1992.
At the time of trial, Takahashi was a fugitive.
4. Proof that the Instruments Were Forgeries
At trial, the Government presented the testimony of Hideo Inoue, the
special officer for research at the Government Bond Section of the
Ministry of Finance in Japan, regarding the authenticity of the bond
certificates. He testified that the bond certificates were not
Inoue compared the bond certificates with genuine Japan government
bonds. He identified the following distinguishing characteristics:
[ UPI GUY NOTE: Were these how Japanese instruments appeared ( below
) in 1957 or the 1980s? ]
(1) The bond certificates did not contain the term “Government of
Japan,” which appears on genuine Japanese bonds;
[ UPI GUY NOTE: Wasn’t the “Government of Japan” earlier named, “The
Imperial Government of Japan” even ‘after World War II’? ]
(2) The Japanese government has never issued an instrument termed a
“certificate of redemption”;
(3) The bond certificates contain the letter “A,” which does not
appear on genuine Japanese bonds;
(4) The numbering on the bond certificates appeared to have been
‘rubber stamped’, whereas genuine bonds contain a “very clear number”
because of the ‘special technology’ that is ‘used’;
[ UPI GUY NOTE: What possible “special technology” could possibly
have been ‘available to have even been used’ back in “1957” or “1958?”
(5) The bond certificates used ‘four- digit numbers’, whereas genuine
bonds contain six- digit numbers;
(6) The bond certificates contained the words “DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK,”
but genuine bonds do not refer to any private bank;
[ EDITOR’S NOTE: Didn’t DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK COMPANY and BANK OF JAPAN
share a role ‘immediately before’ and/or after World War II’ as being
‘issuing bank authorities’, much in the same way BANK OF CHINA had for
decades printed ‘all’ China government money and other financial
(7) The bond certificates contained ‘Japanese / Chinese characters’
with a ‘horizontal line through them’, that genuine bonds do not
(8) The bond certificates had the ‘name of the nominee’ and genuine
bonds do not bear the name of any person as the bondholder;
[ UPI GUY NOTE: ‘All’ instruments such as these ‘do’ possess the
‘nominee name’, however ‘Bearer’ instruments ‘do not bear the name’ of
the “bondholder”. The aforementioned statement may be misleading
somewhat in that the ‘verifier’ may have simply ‘included’ this
mention in his ‘list of determining verification factors’, since it
does ‘not’ make any specific mention as to the instruments he ‘may’
have viewed being falsely represented in this ‘specific’ regard. Even
a ‘low grade forgery’ would ‘not place a name’ where ‘a name should
not be’, and consequently vice-versa. Hence, by stating ‘what the
instruments had’ – no mention as to what they ‘were suppose to have
had’ verses ‘what they did have’- is less than adequate, plus the fact
that the ‘expert made no distinction’ between ‘bearer bonds’ and the
‘instruments presented’, was misleading. ]
(9) The seal on the bond certificates was ‘slightly faded’, ‘not as
clear’, and a ‘less-bright red’ than genuine Japan bonds, and the
‘lines around the seal’ of the bond certificates were’ thicker’ than
around that of genuine bonds;
[ UPI GUY NOTE: Almost 30-year old Japan ‘paper and ink coloring’ of
that vintage does ‘not’ withstand fading even after 7-years. Seal
stampings varied according to either the ‘tool and die’ used or
whomever used it to make the impressions on the instruments would be a
determining factor, and since the manufacturer had long since been
closed, perhaps only ‘the best sample’ was used to compare it with the
ones in this case. Keep documents in cold storage and out of any
harmful ultraviolet ray light and the document can look like ‘brand
new’. There is nothing provided by the verifier of the instruments
that might indicate any comparison as to ‘where’ his ‘specimen’ may
have been pulled from. ]
(10) The bond certificates had face amounts of between ’10,000,000,000
billion yen’ and ’50,000,000,000 billion yen’, but ‘the government of
Japan’ has ‘never issued a bond in an amount greater than
1,000,000,000 billion yen’;
(11) The bond certificates did not have the ‘raised print’ and
Ministry of Finance ‘watermarks’ that ‘genuine bonds contain’; and,
(12) The reverse side of the bond certificates did not contain the
same ‘design’ and ‘warning’ as that on genuine bonds.
Takashi Iwanaga, a vice president of the Manhattan branch of the
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK, testified regarding the authenticity of the bank
Iwanaga described the physical differences between the bank notes and
a genuine DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK Cashier’s Check issued in 1982.
Iwanaga told the jury that the bank notes were counterfeit.
5. Proceedings in the District Court
Schlei was charged in Count One of the second superseding indictment
with conspiring with Ah Loo, Hill, Hansberry, Takahashi, and Alan
(1) to utter and pass falsely made, forged and counterfeit Japanese
bonds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 479;
(2) to possess and deliver false and counterfeit foreign bank notes in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 480;
(3) to use interstate wires in execution of scheme to defraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343;
(4) to execute a scheme to defraud a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2 and 1344;
(5) to offer or sell securities by employing a scheme and artifice to
defraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77q; and,
(6) to engage and attempt to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
The jury was furnished with a special verdict form. The jury found
Schlei guilty of conspiracy.
The jury found that the object of the conspiracy in which Schlei
participated was “[t]o possess and deliver false and counterfeit bank
notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 480.”
The jury also found that it was not an object of Schlei’s conspiracy
“[t]o utter and pass falsely made, forged, and counterfeit Government
of Japan Series 57 M-Bonds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 479.”
Schlei was found not guilty of uttering or passing false, forged, and
counterfeit bonds, five counts of wire fraud, bank fraud, and engaging
in a monetary transaction involving unlawfully derived property.
Schlei was found guilty of securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77q and 77x.
The jury found specially that “[ Schlei ] obtained money or property
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
1. The Evidence Demonstrates that Schlei Affirmatively Misled
Potential Purchasers Regarding Material Facts
Schlei argues that the evidence presented to the jury is legally
insufficient to demonstrate that he committed fraud – an essential
element of conspiracy to commit fraud and the substantive offense of
securities fraud charged in Count Ten of the second superseding
indictment. Schlei contends that the Government failed to present
evidence that he was involved in a scheme “reasonably calculated to
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.” He argues
that pursuant to the rule announced in United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d
1550 ( 11th Cir. 1996 , we must reverse. We disagree. The facts and
circumstances presented to the jury in this matter are readily
distinguishable from those reviewed by this court in Brown.
In Brown, the defendants represented to prospective customers from
snow- belt states that the homes they were selling in Florida were a
safe business investment and could be rented for an amount greater
than the mortgage payments. Id. at 1554. In fact, the houses were
being sold at a higher price than an almost identical home next door.
The houses were not a good investment because they were overpriced.
The rental income was less than represented. Some of the purchasers
resold their homes for much less than they paid. Id.
In reversing the judgment of conviction, this court held that “[a]
“scheme to defraud’ under the pertinent criminal statutes has not been
proved where a reasonable juror would have to conclude that the
representation is about something which the customer should, and
could, easily confirm – if they wished to do so – from readily
available external sources.” Id. at 1559.
Applying this rule to the facts before it, this court concluded that
potential home buyers were encouraged to travel to Florida at the
expense of the developer to visit the properties offered for sale. The
court noted that “this matter is not a “sale of distant property’
case: the kind where the purchaser has no chance to investigate the
property’s condition and value.” Id. at 1560.
The court held that reliance on the value representations was
unreasonable because a person of ordinary prudence could have easily
discovered the cost of buying or renting comparable properties in
Florida. Id. at 1551.
Here, unlike the situation in Brown, we have a “distant property” case.
The conspirators represented that “a secret fund to be used for
various purposes not suitable for public view” was created in Japan by
General MacArthur and Japan officials approximately 50-years ago.
They also claimed that the government of Japan issued the financial
instruments to persons who contributed to the secret fund, but that
corrupt Japanese officials were now falsely claiming that they were
In making these representations, the conspirators told prospective
purchasers that a former Assistant Attorney General of the United
States had determined that the financial instruments were genuine and
Furthermore, a document typed on the letterhead of the United States
Embassy was shown to potential customers to persuade them that “the
United States was supporting Mr. Schlei.”
Under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that a potential customer could not easily
confirm the truth of the representation that a secret fund allegedly
created by persons who have since died is now being covered up by a
corrupt government of Japan.
The conspirators represented that the financial instruments were
genuine, but that the government of Japan would deny that the
financial instruments were genuine.
Had any potential customer of the conspirators and their salespersons
attempted to contact the government of Japan, he or she would have
been confronted with a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Because the instruments were not genuine, the Japan Minister of
Finance would undoubtedly inform any person who inquired that the bond
certificates and bank notes were worthless.
The exercise of ordinary intelligence would not have assisted a
potential customer in confirming from a readily available external
source that the conspirators’ representations were truthful.
We decline to extend Brown to the false representations made by the
conspirators to this fraudulent scheme.
2. Sufficient Evidence Was Presented to Support the Judgment of
Conviction for Conspiring to Sell the Fraudulent Bank Notes
Schlei also maintains that “[n]o evidence was presented at trial
showing that Schlei or anyone else engaged at any time in fraudulent
behavior with respect to the “bank notes.’ “
The record does not support this argument.
Schlei entered into an agreement with Hiraki, Takahashi, Lee, and Han
concerning the negotiation and cashing of bank notes drawn on the
DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK in the spring of 1985.
In May 1985, Schlei and Lee attempted to cash one (1) of the bank
notes at the DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK in Japan. They were informed that
the bank note was not genuine.
Nevertheless, on May 7, 1986 Schlei, as secretary and treasurer of the
JAPAN-AMERICA FOUNDATION INC., assigned a bank note described as
“cashier’s check No. A35240” to HILL & ASSOCIATES INC.
The disclosure form letter that Norbert A. Schlei presented to Hill
for distribution to potential purchasers expressly referred to
cashier’s checks “that purport to be issued by the DAI-ICHI KANGYO
Thus, contrary to Schlei’s assertion, members of the conspiracy
entered into an agreement to sell fraudulent bank notes after Schlei
and Lee had been informed by a representative of the DAI-ICHI KANGYO
BANK that they were not genuine.
The record also discloses that Hill was furnished an additional bank
note by Takahashi on September 20, 1991.
Takahashi was aware that Hill was involved in the proposed sale of a
bond certificate to Agent Fox and Agent Sankey.
One of the bank notes was seized from Hill following his arrest in
This evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational juror that the
members of the conspiracy, including Schlei, had not abandoned their
agreement to sell bank notes that were known to be worthless prior to
January 18, 1992.
The fact that no bank notes were successfully negotiated does not
affect the validity of the judgment of conviction for conspiracy to
sell them. See United States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353, 1356 (11th
Cir.1982) ( ” [W]hether the object of the conspiracy is achieved is
immaterial to the commission of the crime of conspiracy. ” ).
3. The Evidence Is Sufficient to Demonstrate that Schlei’s
Misrepresentations and Concealment Were Material
Schlei asserts that the representations made by the alleged
conspirators did not relate to a material fact. He argues that the
only fact that is material to a prospective purchaser of a financial
instrument is “whether the instrument will be paid when due.” Schlei
contends that where it is represented that a financial instrument will
not be paid “other information that might indirectly suggest a
possibility or probability of nonpayment becomes merely cumulative and
Schlei’s argument ignores the fact that he and his co-conspirators
represented that the financial instruments were genuine. Clearly, a
representation of genuineness is material to a prospective purchaser
of an alleged negotiable instrument.
Perhaps of more significance, however, is the fact that Norbert Schlei
and his co-conspirators concealed the fact that Norbert A. Schlei knew
that Aoyagi had been convicted in a Japan court for participating in
producing forged bond certificates and bank notes.
Star-Banner ( Ocala, Florida newspaper ):
– – – –RESEARCH NOTES ( Other ) –
CIRCA: 1985 – 1992
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CASE NO.: CR-92 49 T 17C
SOURCE: Reuter’s News Wire and The Los Angeles Times
Florida Federal Jury Finds:
2 Convicted In Sale Of Counterfeit Bonds
January 7, 1995
TAMPA, Florida — An investment company owner from Irvine and a former
U.S. Department Of Justice official have been convicted of charges
stemming from the sale of $400,000,000 million worth of counterfeit
Japan government bonds, prosecutors said.
In a verdict returned late Thursday, a Tampa federal court jury found
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo guilty on 10 counts of conspiracy, bank
fraud, securities fraud, money-laundering, wire fraud and passing
counterfeit Japan bonds.
Norbert A. Schlei was convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to
possess and deliver counterfeit foreign bank notes.
Schlei, a 65-year-old attorney from Beverly Hills, was an assistant
attorney general during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and
was an adviser to then-Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Attorney
Generals Robert F. Kennedy and Nicolas Katzenbach, according to U.S.
Attorney Charles Wilson.
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo ( 66 ) of Irvine, is the managing
director of TRANSFIELD INVESTMENTS LTD.
Two ( 2 ) other defendants, Bruce Hansberry and Roger Hill, changed
their pleas to guilty during the trial.
Barbara Jean Bravender Ah Loo’s ‘son’ Bruce Hansberry lives in Tampa,
Roger Hill ( 58 ) of Mesa, Arizona is an independent securities
broker, the prosecutor said.
A fifth ( 5th ) defendant, Alan Reedy, was found ‘not guilty’ at trial.
A sixth ( 6th ) defendant, Toshio Takahashi, remains a fugitive from justice.
Ah Loo, Hansberry and Hill were arrested 2-years ago during
negotiations to sell a counterfeit 50,000,000,000 billion yen Japan
bond to undercover federal agents posing as purchasers. At the time,
50,000,000,000 billion yen was worth about $400,000,000 million,
Federal agents seized more than $2,000,000,000 billion worth of
counterfeit Japan [ Series 57 ] bonds and DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK
cashier’s checks from the defendants.
Federal authorities began investigating the defendants in 1991 after
receiving a tip that Ah Loo’s company [ TRANSFIELD INVESTMENTS LTD. ]
was offering to market up-to $16,000,000,000 billion worth of
counterfeit Japan securities, Wilson said.
According to trial testimony, the conspiracy began in 1986 when Schlei
and others obtained counterfeit Japan government bonds and cashier’s
checks [ cashier cheques ].
“Prosecutions of fraud cases such as this ‘preserve the integrity of
the financial markets’ in this country and globally,” Wilson said.
Ah Loo, Hansberry and Hill face sentences of up-to 200-years in prison
plus fines of more than $200,000,000 million.
Schlei faces up to 6-years in prison and $350,000 in fines.
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On September 14, 1999 Norbert Schlei ( a 71 year old resident of Santa
Monica, California ) had his license to practice law suspended for
6-months but received 38-months credit from the lawyer’s Bar
Association that crediting Schlei’s earlier Bar Association ‘interim
suspension’ while federally imprisoned.
The Bar Association then provided Schlei with a 1-year probation Order
to be run concurrently while completing his MPRE, whereafter the Bar
Association Ordered Norbert Anthony Schlei reinstated to practice law
once again in good standing on September 14, 2000.
Less than 2-1/2 years later, on April 21, 2003 Norbert Anthony Schlei
died in Los Angeles, California.
On June 3, 2009, Japan Series 57 Bonds reappeared during the bond
seizure in Chiasso, Italy afterwhich the U.S. Secret Service declared
such to be “counterfeit.”
In 2010, I received an e-mail from Neil Francis Keenan informing me
the Chiasso, Italy bonds previously entrusted to him were genuine and
had been verified according to his sources, one of which I learned
from Keenan happened to be Howard Edward Wales who poses as a
high-value international bank paper asset instrument trader of
securities tied to fraudulently claimed “secret trading programs”
supposedly tied to, amongst other things, U.S. Department Of Defense (
DOD ) Pentagon defense and space Programs.
International “Master Traders” ( also known as ) ‘master fraudsters’
and their ‘promoters’ have a routine of offering ‘high-net worth’ and
‘ultra-high-net worth individual investors’ what are termed “High
Yield Investment Programs” ( also known as ) ” HYIP ” ( pronounced:
‘Hype’ ) promising exhorbitant rates of interest returns that never
materialze, which few people in the world know anything about.
“Prime Fraud Trading Program Representations” ( March 25, 2008 ):
This subject is a field of international financial intelligence (
FININT ) operations I am keenly familiar with involving a whole
variety of ‘believeable personages’, including:
– Former Government Officials ( see Norbert Anthony Schlei – as above );
– Former Federal Reserve Bank Officials;
– Billionaire Moguls and Magnates; and,
– Members of Knighted Orders ( e.g. O.S.J. Knights Of Malta, et. al. );
– Other Prominent Personages.
The purpose of the “Master Fraudster” is to locate prominent entity
names or individual personalities of high-net-worth and/or
ultra-high-net-worth ( UHNW ) individual investors whom are then
tricked sophisticatedly into supporting an investment that ends-up
becoming nothing more than a ‘black-hole investment schemes’.
There are even ‘global fraud’ “clubs” ( the “1888 Club” ) that plan
such schemes at special convention center meeting places around the
world, an exclusive topic I wrote about years ago.
“Mafia Goes Global With Clubs Targeting Rich” ( June 23, 2008 ):
The most prevalent of such a scheme, which the mainstream news media
never broadcasted anything meaningful to the public public about,
involved Bill Gates ( founder of the MICROSOFT CORPORATION ) where his
“Internet In The Sky” ( a global broadband internet communication
system ) Project fraud involved likewise high-net-worth and
ultra-high-net worth ( UHNW ) ‘individual investors’, e.g. Middle East
Royal Family members, military generals, et. al. whom were all
defrauded by what appeared to be a ‘legitimate’ “investment program”
that tantamountly stole over $1,000,000,000 billion dollars based on
what began as an article in TIME Magazine covering a company named
TELEDESIC HOLDINGS LTD. promoting the sale of an ‘old super-high
technology’ U.S. National Security Agency ( NSA ) satellite
constellation system then-comprised of only fifty-two ( 52 )
satellites earmarked for replacement by a ‘new system’.
Much of the scandalous portions of TELEDESIC, the NSA, Arab Royal
Family Saudi Arabia His Royal Highness Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin
Abdul Aziz Alsaud who was later tied by former New York Mayor Rudolph
Guiliani to al-Qaeda financiers has all but been completely erased
from the internet, however a few remnants of information surrounding
the fraudulent EAGLE RIVER INC. investment Special Purpose Vehicle (
SPV ) may still be found in places other than my global
mini-intelligence network database files.
Government Non-Official Cover ( NOC ) Agents
And, last but not least, are the NOC foreign nationals whom, as U.S.
and British ‘government intelligence operative fraudsters’, operate
with “Global Immunity” from prosecution anywhere in the world simply
because that in the course of their “service” can say and do anything
“in the interest of national security” – provisions underwhich they
A classic case, one ( 1 ) of so very many, was the CIA led DOJ “Squad
Six” ( Portland, Oregon, USA ) missioned NOC foreign national
intelligence operative Gabriel Francis MacEnroe ( see immediately
below ) who eventually crossed that ‘very fine line’, was eventually
federally indicted, prosecuted in a federal criminal court, sentenced
to a U.S. federal prison term, and then released to return home to
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
GABRIEL MACENROE, and
CASE NO.: CR-697-ALL
[ EXCERPT ]
… [ EDITED-OUT FOR BREVITY ] …
7. It was a further part of the conspiracy that JOSEPH SILVESTRI,
DAVID MORGENSTERN, AND GABRIEL MACENROE would and did make repeated
interstate and international telephone calls to the witness, and met
personally with the Witness [ i.e. Vernon Shifflet, of Ohio ], during
which they made false and misleading representations about various
proposed investments, their backgrounds and expertise in
sophisticated investment programs, their association with
select international traders who could effectuate participation in
guaranteed high-yield investment programs, and their relationship
with and licenses from various governmental agencies sponsoring
projects which could result in high investment returns.
Such false statements and misrepresentations included, but were
not limited to the following, that:
– one proposed investment program was a National Security Agency
( NSA ) approved venture involving 52 satellites, which would be
audited during the first three months by the NSA and then
certified by the NSA;
– the witness’s $60,000,000 investment would be part of a
$500,000,000 block of funds, and that the $60,000,000 would
quickly rise to $100,000,000;
– if the witness wanted the Central Intelligence Agency [ CIA ] to
control his investment, then that could be arranged;
– the witness’s investment would initially earn between 5% and
7% per week, then subsequently 20% per week, and that it could
earn over 1,000% and up to 1,500% per year;
– there would be no risk to the witness’s money, that his money
could be taken out of the bank account at any time, that the
account was very liquid and that the witness must always be
in control of his money;
– Government authorities would approve such investments;
– GABRIEL MACENROE worked with the U.S. Treasury;
– Federal Reserve Bank engages in negotiations with GABRIEL MACENROE
and/or his associates regarding the investments;
– Federal Reserve Bank sets up “mirror accounts” through which
investments can be traded without any risk to the principal investment;
– GABRIEL MACENROE had a license from the NSA;
– GABRIEL MACENROE was a CIA Trustee;
– GABRIEL MACENROE was an FBI collector and that MACENROE’S father
was also an FBI collector;
– GABRIEL MACENROE was “1 of 5 traders in the world” who handle
these types of investments;
… [ EDITED-OUT FOR BREVITY ] …
J. RENE JOSEY, U.S. Attorney
DAVID C. STEPHENS, Assistant U.S. Attorney
JAMES R. PAVLOCK, Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
… [ EDITED-OUT FOR BREVITY ] …
“Spies Use IMF Fraud Overseas” ( March 17, 2006 ):
H. Edward Wales, was one of many such “Traders” with a long history of
involvement with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ), and as
for Ed Wales many files originate straight out-of U.S. federal court
records also retained in my intelligence files.
Why would Neil Francis Keenan, who claims Benjamin Fulford hund the
jacket of Keenan being connected to the CIA, have anything to do with
Who handed Neil Keenan the portion of bonds seized in Chiasso, Italy
that the U.S. Secret Service declared “counterfeit”?
“Mystery of Fake U.S. Bonds Fuels Web Theories” ( June 25, 2009 ):
Did H. Ed Wales pass the other portion of bonds given to Keenan to
Danielle dal Bosco for sake-keeping, and if so, where did Wales get
those bonds from in the first place?
Did those Japan Series 57 bonds in 2009 come from the 1992 Norbert A.
Schlei federal court case file file custodial officer whom turned it
over to the federal U.S. Attorney who either turned it over to KROLL
ASSOCIATES INC. on behalf of the U.S. Department of the Treasury or
did it come from an even earlier ( 1986 ) federal U.S. court criminal
case involving Edison Damanik?
I have researched cases that involved seized securities labelled
“counterfeit” that somehow magically ‘reappear’ in another part of the
world 2-years later, and then reappear about 2-years later in yet even
another part of the world in yet another case instance, and I’m not
talking about “copies” but “originals” of the same exact financial
instruments that were to have been turned over to the U.S. government.
Unfortunately, the U.S. fovernment has a poor record of holding on-to
high-value securities, even when they are out ‘on loan’ by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury to ‘institutes’ for higher learning where
mysterious robberies have taken place over a period of decades.
Are U.S. and other foreign national government intelligence agencies
circulating ‘certain bank paper instruments’ for use in ‘global sting
operations’ around the world? My experience and files indicate the
answer. Yes, but not necessarily in ‘all cases’, and the only way one
can know is to keep track of what instruments were used where, which I
happen to know a little more about than most is all.
The best investment bet? If anyone wants ‘you’ or ‘someone you know’
to ‘invest monies’ in-to any ‘investment program’, just say: “No”!
Respectfully submitted for review and commentary by,
The Unwanted Publicity Intelligence Guy
About The Author –
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